The Diplomatic Record 1989-1990 by David D. Newsom

Author:David D. Newsom [Newsom, David D.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General
ISBN: 9780429310058
Google: 1pwYyAEACAAJ
Goodreads: 49787999
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-01-15T08:13:44+00:00

Multilateral, National, and Bilateral Negotiations

Since the start of the negotiations in 1968, the main negotiating forum has been the CD8 in Geneva and its predecessors,9 Formally, the plenary is the main body of the CD, but this is, in fact, solely a forum for reading out prepared statements and a meeting place to talk with colleagues in the corridors. The ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the CD is responsible for the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention. The actual negotiations, however, take place in formal and informal meetings of the working groups of this Committee and in special contact groups. The CD convenes for two sessions of three months each, a spring session in the months February, March, and April and a summer session in June, July, and August.10 The ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons also convenes, formally or informally, in the period between the summer session and the spring session, usually during three weeks starting at the end of November, and during a three-week period in January, immediately preceding the spring session of the CD.

The projected convention will probably, at least in principle, open the most secret military and commercial locations and facilities. That is why the most heated negotiations on a chemical weapons ban often do not take place in Geneva, but in national capitals, usually between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the one hand and the Ministry of Economic Affairs or the Ministry of Defense on the other. These internal negotiations are easily overlooked, because they usually take place in secret. When a delegation stubbornly adheres to a position that lacks logic—and certainly when the delegation has visible difficulty in explaining its position—the reason is often that negotiations at home have led to an unfortunate compromise.

The two superpowers possess the major part of all chemical weapon stocks.11 It is therefore obvious that bilateral negotiations between them can play an important part in the multilateral negotiations on a worldwide ban. The relationship between the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations is, however, not without some inherent tension. As long as the bilaterals concentrate on detailed arrangements for the declaration and destruction of the chemical weapons of both countries, the results are generally welcomed— although the United States and the Soviet Union have an understandable inclination to save their most effective chemical weapons as long as possible, while countries without chemical weapons would rather see the most dangerous weapons destroyed first. Bilateral negotiations on subjects that might directly affect the industry and the armed forces of every party would, however, be viewed with suspicion. The bilaterals therefore mainly concentrate on the problems of declaring and destroying stocks and chemical weapon production plants and on bilateral measures to strengthen confidence between the two countries before the convention enters into force. An additional problem of the bilaterals is that they draw scarce manpower away from the multilateral negotiations. According to other delegations, this has led to an appreciable slowing down of the pace of the multilateral negotiations.

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